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Abstract  
Our project goal was to develop potential initiatives for the Danish Consumer 
Council to protect consumers from excessive indebtedness. Payday loans are short term, 
high interest loans which are intended for emergency expenses. These loans have very 
high interest rates which can trap consumers in a cycle of debt if not paid off on time. 
Through our research, we found that the three major reasons for payday loan 
indebtedness are: consumers are trapped in a cycle of debt, payday lenders are running a 
delinquency intensive business, and payday loan advertisements are targeting impulsive 
consumers. To address these three problems, we identified four initiatives and one 
recommendation that can regulate the industry and help protect Danish consumers. The 
first initiative we propose is a charge cap that will prevent excessive interest payment and 
cycles of debt. The second initiative is prohibition on images or intended use content in 
payday loan advertising, in order to reduce targeting of impulsive consumers. Our third 
initiative is strengthening the current cool-off period regulation in Denmark to reduce 
impulsive utilization of payday loans. Our fourth suggestion is creating a government-run 
database that has all loan information on record, to reduce delinquency in payday loan 
use. Data limitations have been a significant obstacle to understanding the industry and 
its effect on consumers. To overcome this issue, we recommend lenders be required to 
report key business metrics for the purposes of further monitoring of consumer health by 
the Financial Supervisory Authority. 
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Payday loans: Predatory 
lending or a useful financial 
tool? 
Payday loans are small cash loans 
usually provided online with no collateral. 
Payday loan companies charge excessively high 
interest rates, sometimes sending those with 
difficult financial situations into even more 
precarious positions. These loans have annual 
percentage rates (APR) that are often greater 
than 400% when compounded monthly (See 
Figures 1 and 2).1 Compared to the average 14% 
APR of a credit card, the APRs of payday loans 
are extremely high.2 The high interest rates of 
payday loans combined with the low incomes of 
the borrowers makes it easy to become locked in 
a cycle of debt, which leads the borrower to owe 
multiple times the original loan amount.3 
In recent years the payday lending 
industry in Denmark has increased dramatically. 
Between 2010 and 2014 the number of loans 
issued increased by 700% from 20,000 to 
160,000.4 The large increase in the number of 
loans taken out combined with the potential for a 
consumer to become trapped in a cycle of debt 
exacerbates the problem of excessive 
indebtedness. The risk associated with the 
increase in payday loan use warrants a need for 
consumer protection. 
Governments across the globe have been 
realizing the risks of payday loans and have 
implemented legislation to protect consumers by 
regulating the industry. Denmark’s government 
has also begun to take steps toward regulating 
this industry, but the legislation that was enacted 
proved ineffective in dealing with this problem. 
The Danish Consumer Council is looking to 
develop and investigate additional initiatives to 
protect consumers from excessive indebtedness 
that could be a result of payday lending. 
The final goal for our project was to 
identify effective initiatives to protect Danish 
consumers from excessive indebtedness as a 
result of payday lending. To achieve this goal, 
we determined the problems within the lending 
industry, potential solutions, and previous 
initiatives. To identify these problems, possible 
solutions and past initiatives, we interviewed 
various stakeholders; including a payday lender, 
a behavior specialist, two financial advisors, and 
three politicians spanning from left to right; we 
conducted literature reviews; and performed 
content analysis of payday loan websites and 
advertisements. Through our findings we were 
able to make recommendations to the Danish 
Consumer council in order to protect consumers. 
Figure 1. An example of a payday website showing an APR of 688.69% Figure 2. Another example showing 761.54% APR 
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Creating a safer consumer 
environment 
In this section, we first establish the 
characteristics of a payday loan and provide some 
history behind the payday lending industry. We 
then discuss how the payday lending industry can 
be harmful to consumers. Once we establish the 
problem, we discuss the individuals who are most 
likely to use payday loans. After characterizing 
typical borrowers, we switch our focus to discuss 
the payday lending businesses and legislation 
related to payday lending. We first explore the 
profitability of payday lenders. A major part of 
the profitability of payday lenders is their high 
customer acquisition cost which we go on to 
explain. We then discuss how other countries 
have begun to take action to regulate the industry. 
Finally, the focus moves to discuss details on the 
Danish payday lending market.  
Payday loans can lead consumers to 
a cycle of debt 
Payday loans are short-term, small-dollar, 
high interest, unsecured loans, designed to 
provide credit for customers facing unexpected 
expenses or financial crises. Payday loans are 
structured as closed end loans, meaning that the 
initial amount must be repaid in full at the end of 
the term on a specified date. However, payday 
loans are often rolled over and incur a much 
higher cost for consumers. This common pattern 
of chronic borrowing in payday lending leads 
consumers to excessive indebtedness.  
Payday loans are mainly distinguished by 
their high interest rates and low credit standards. 
If the typical 15% interest rate for a two-week 
payday loan in the United States is converted to 
an APR, it would be approximately 3700%.5 This 
is far higher than the 14% average APR of a 
credit card.2 Moreover, payday loans have lower 
credit requirements than other financial products, 
as consumers with poor or no credit history still 
have access to them.1  
The payday loan industry has its origins 
in the 1980s and has since grown into a 
multibillion dollar industry in the United States 
and internationally.6 The industry experienced 
explosive growth in the 1990s as mainstream 
banks stopped offering small unsecured loans due 
to the introduction of credit cards. The absence of 
this type of loan allowed payday lending entities 
to develop, therefore satisfying the demand for 
short term credit.1 
Offering credit to people with limited 
options is a good service, but the combination of 
high prices, short terms, and low credit 
requirements can trap individuals in a cycle of 
debt. Borrowers in a cycle of debt cannot repay 
the loan in full when it is due (See Figure 3). 
They take out new loans or pay the rollover fees 
to postpone paying off their debt, which causes 
these loans to last for months or even years. The 
rolling over of loans results in a much higher 
total cost for the consumers.3 Empirical evidence 
shows that only some of the individuals who 
utilize payday loans can repay the loans on time. 
In 2009, 12 million of the 19 million Americans 
who took out payday loans found themselves 
trapped in a cycle of debt. Nearly two thirds of 
payday loan customers are repeat borrowers with 
at least 12 loan transactions per year.7 Similarly, 
in the United Kingdom 52% of payday loan 
borrowers experienced debt problems between 
2009 and 2014. In 2011 alone, 28% of payday 
loans were rolled over at least once and five 
percent were rolled over more than four times.8  
 
Figure 3. The Cycle of Debt 
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Payday loan borrowers are most 
likely to be underbanked and 
financially vulnerable 
Consumers with poor access to traditional 
financial services (underbanked) are more likely 
to use alternative financial services such as 
payday loans. In 2011, the Federal Reserve found 
that 40% of underbanked households in United 
States used payday loans. This is significantly 
greater than the five percent of fully banked 
households who utilized these loans.9 Similarly, 
an Australian study found that only seven percent 
of payday loan borrowers had a credit card, while 
87% of the general population had a credit card 
(See Figure 4). When there is less access to 
traditional forms of credit, payday lenders are 
used instead.6  
Borrowers of payday loans are also more 
likely to be financially vulnerable. These 
individuals have very little wealth and find 
themselves in need of money during financial 
emergencies. A 2010 Australian study revealed 
that almost 80% of the individuals who took out 
payday loans were receiving a pension or social 
welfare payment. Many of the individuals 
interviewed did not feel as though they had a 
choice in the management of their finances.6 
Meanwhile, in a study of United States 
consumers, the majority of payday loan 
borrowers earned USD$10,000-USD$20,000 
annually per capita and 25% of borrowers were 
on some form of public assistance.10 This aligns 
with an Australian study that found borrowers 
from low income households use payday loans 
more often.6 Denmark has a similar situation, 
with the majority of payday loan borrowers being 
outside the labor market: sickness benefit 
recipients, retirees, or others without a steady 
income. Eleven percent of Danes outside the 
labor market have used a payday loan whereas 
only four percent of the population in the labor 
market have taken out a payday loan. The lack of 
a steady income creates barriers to the borrowers’ 
ability to pay back their loans, while it also 
creates subsequent risks for payday lending 
companies.4 
Profitability is low in payday 
lending 
Payday companies are less profitable than 
traditional banks. The CEO of Community 
Financial Service Association, who is the voice 
for the small-dollar, short-term lending industry 
in the United States, said payday loan companies 
were making an average of four percent return on 
investment.11 Cash America is one of the few 
public payday lenders which allows for a detailed 
look at the flow of money within the company. 
Cash America is a multinational company and 
had a 10.2% return on investment.3 Both of these 
return on investment rates are quite low 
compared to a 32% return on investment for the 
commercial bank industry.12 
The low profitability is a result of the 
high risk of default combined with the relatively 
high processing costs and customer acquisition 
costs borne by the lending companies. The high 
Figure 4. Credit Card Status vs. Payday Borrowing in Australia6  
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default risks stem from the methods that payday 
lending companies use to price risk.1 Traditional 
lending businesses use rate-for-risk pricing by 
basing their interest rates on the potential risk 
posed by the borrower.13 Instead of this, payday 
lenders use a cost plus pricing methodology, 
meaning the interest rate of each loan is a fixed 
rate. Because the interest rate is fixed, there is no 
way to price the varying credit risk of borrowers. 
Payday lending companies use the cost plus 
pricing methodology to make up for the high 
processing and customer acquisition costs with 
high interest on the loans.3 
 Second, payday lenders have relatively 
high processing costs. Processing costs for 
lending companies mostly consist of manual 
credit checking and other paperwork. While 
payday lenders bear the same fixed costs per loan 
as traditional lending institutions, they have 
much higher relative processing expenses than 
banks because they issue loans that are both 
smaller in amount and greater in quantity.3 
 Third, the customer acquisition costsi of 
payday lending companies are much higher than 
traditional lenders’. The high cost is due to the 
relatively high amount of advertising required per 
successful sale.3 Moreover, payday lenders do 
not have an established customer base compared 
to traditional lending institutions, so they must 
spend more money to seek out and attract new 
customers. The relatively higher risks and higher 
costs borne by payday lending companies create 
a lending situation that requires chronic 
borrowing. Chronic borrowing of payday loans 
can lead consumers to excessive indebtedness, 
warranting legislation to regulate the industry. 
Payday lenders have a high 
customer acquisition cost 
Payday lenders use a variety of costly 
strategies to acquire first time customers, such as 
‘refer a friend’ programs, discounting of first 
loans, and deferred interest payments. For 
example, in ‘refer a friend’ programs the 
company rewards customers who bring in other 
individuals to utilize the business. The reward 
paid to the existing customer increases the 
consumer acquisition cost. The discounting of an 
initial loan to entice new customers is also 
considered a customer acquisition cost. The 
discount can be thought of as the payday lender 
paying for the first time customer’s loan to be 
less expensive.3 Payday lenders high customer 
acquisition costs are shown in their operating 
expenses; for example, Ferratum spends 13-17% 
of revenues in its small consumer loans segments 
on marketing.14 A report by the Association of 
Chartered Certified Accountants found that a 
payday lending company, Cash America spent 17
-20% of revenues on advertising and marketing.3 
In comparison, Sparekassen Sjælland-Fyn, a mid-
sized European consumer bank, does not even 
break out the marketing costs on the income 
statement due to their negligible value.15 In fact, 
Cash America’s customer acquisition cost is so 
high that the cost is not covered until a 
customer’s third loan (See Figure 5).3 To cover 
their high customer acquisition costs, some 
payday lenders raise their interest rates, which in 
turn makes the loans less attractive for 
consumers, and causes the company to spend 
even more on customer acquisition.  
Figure 5. Customer Acquisition Costs vs. Customer Lifetime Value3 
i The customer acquisition cost includes research, 
marketing, and advertising costs associated with 
convincing a customer to use a service. 
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Internationally, regulations have 
been implemented to protect 
consumers from payday loan 
indebtedness 
Many countries have developed national 
regulatory bodies to supervise the payday lending 
industry and protect consumers. Typical 
regulations include components such as interest 
rate limits, cool-down periods, cool off periods, 
regulation of advertising, loan extension limits, 
and mandatory due diligence. The cool-down 
period is a way to prevent consumers from taking 
out multiple loans within a certain period of 
time.16 Mandatory due diligence requires 
companies to reasonably determine a customer’s 
ability to repay the loan.1 A cool-off period 
allows customers to consider whether the loan is 
necessary by giving them a period of time to 
cancel the loan.16 Denmark has only enacted a 48
-hour cool-off period, which leaves several more 
regulatory options on the table.17 
The international payday lending industry 
has a problem with the cycle of debt. Because the 
cycle of debt is common within the global payday 
lending industry, it is worthwhile to regulate the 
growing Danish payday lending industry for the 
purpose of consumer protection. In 2010, Danish 
consumers took out 37 million DKK (USD$6.3 
million) in payday loans. Four years later this 
number had jumped more than tenfold to 430 
million DKK (USD$76 million) (See Table 1).4 
The rapid expansion of the industry has made it 
difficult for consumer protection measures to 
keep up, and amplifies the importance of 
identifying effective consumer protection 
measures. 
Determining potential 
initiatives: Our process 
The goal of this project was to develop 
initiatives that protect consumers from excessive 
indebtedness resulting from misuse of payday 
lending. We researched payday loans using 
interviews, content analysis, and a literature 
review. Our project objectives were: 
An overview of our methods is shown in 
Figure 6. The methods used were literature 
review, interviews, and online surveys. Literature 
review sources included academic reports and 
professional studies on payday lending practices, 
the industry and legislative initiatives. The 
literature review prepared us for our semi-
structured interviews with various groups of 
stakeholders and assisted in the development of a 
website survey and marketing survey for the 
online payday lenders in Denmark. Furthermore, 
this literature review was used to triangulate the 
findings from interviews and supplement the 
information gathered from our surveys. Our 
website survey was performed by collecting data 
about usability, product pricing, and credit rating 
methods on the major Danish payday lender 
websites. Finally, our marketing survey evaluated 
the marketing materials of payday lenders. We 
gathered opinions on all sides of the payday 
lending issue to craft a solution that protects 
consumers and preserves the market.  
 Year Number of Loans Amount of Loans 
2010 20,000 37 Million DKK 
2014 160,000 430 Million DKK 
Table 1. Payday Lending Market Expansion in Denmark 
1. Assess the business models of payday 
lenders to understand their costs and 
revenues 
2. Evaluate customer acquisition methods of 
payday lenders 
3. Identify the role of legislation on the 
payday lending industry in Denmark and 
internationally. 
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Assess the business models of 
payday lenders to understand their 
costs and revenues 
Business models articulate the ways in 
which companies interact with and acquire 
customers, as well as methods of profit 
generation. The main components of a business 
model are the cost structure, value proposition, 
key activities, revenue streams, customer 
segments, customer relationships, and customer 
communication.18 Our project documented 
relevant aspects of these components through an 
interview with a lender and a survey of payday 
lending websites (See Appendices B and G for 
the protocol and questions). 
Our interview with a payday lender 
covered a range of topics from credit rating, 
customer demographics, sources of revenue and 
expenses. The responses to these questions gave 
us information from a direct source on the 
operation of payday lending companies. 
For the assessment of online payday lender 
business models, we performed a content analysis 
of 14 Danish payday lenders’ websites. To 
choose our sample, we identified the first 14 
payday lending websites shown on a Google 
search for “Kviklån” (payday loan) because we 
deemed these to be the most likely customer 
choices. The survey allowed us to gather data on 
over 80% of the Danish retail payday loan market 
in Denmark.19 Information gathered included 
interest rates, policy terms, and the number and 
content of the fields required to apply for a loan. 
The survey gave us insight to the online business 
model, and helped us to understand the current 
interest rates, loan amounts, and process of 
payday lending in Denmark (See Appendix L for 
details). The information gathered from the 
website survey was cross referenced with the 
supplemental research on business models to 
determine common practices within the industry. 
 Evaluate the customer acquisition 
methods of payday lenders 
Payday lenders use a variety of different 
customer acquisition methods, however 
advertising is the most prevalent. To get a better 
understanding of how lenders market to new 
customers, we performed an advertising survey, 
read academic journals on advertisement, 
interviewed a consumer behavior expert and a 
Figure 6. Methodology Overview 
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payday lender. 
 The interview conducted with the 
behavioral specialist yielded further information 
on how advertisements affect consumers. The 
behavioral specialist helped refine our coding 
process and analysis of our marketing survey 
through their understanding of consumer 
influence techniques. Additionally the consumer 
behavioral specialist had a unique perspective on 
what future programs or initiatives may be most 
effective (See Appendix C for questions). 
 We conducted a content analysis of 32 
payday loan video advertisements. The 
advertisements were obtained from a variety of 
media sources including online and public 
transport. By identifying demographic 
information such as the age of the actor and 
psychographic informationii, such as the overall 
themes and experiences shown, we were able to 
determine the common themes for payday loan 
advertisements. This analysis revealed those 
targeted by these ads and the most prominent 
visual triggers in payday lending advertisements 
(See Appendix K for rubric). The information 
gathered from the advertisement survey was cross 
referenced with the supplemental research on 
marketing to determine common advertising 
themes within the industry. 
Identify the role of legislation on the 
payday lending industry in Denmark 
and internationally 
With a knowledge of previous and current 
initiatives and regulations, we performed a 
comparative analysis of legislation from various 
countries. We first categorized the broad types of 
initiatives such as cool down periods and interest 
rate caps. Next, the components of each country’s 
legislation were sorted into these categories. This 
comparison showed us possible initiatives which 
Denmark could implement and the groups of 
stakeholders that support these initiatives. 
To investigate Denmark’s payday lending 
legislation, we conducted semi-structured 
interviews with three members of Parliament 
spanning the left, center, and right of the political 
spectrum (See Figure 7) (See Appendices D, E, F 
for questions). Using this range of political views 
and the main factors that go into these 
regulations, we were able to formulate potential 
regulations in a more impartial manner. The 
knowledge gained from these interviews helped 
us in drafting the initiatives we proposed to the 
Danish Consumer Council. 
We interviewed a senior economic advisor 
from the Danish Consumer Council.20 The Danish 
Consumer Council has been researching payday 
loans and the senior economic advisor knows 
about the previous initiatives taken in Denmark. 
Learning about initiatives that the Danish 
Consumer Council has proposed and how they 
perceive the effect of previous initiatives helped 
us in determining our initiatives (See Appendix H 
for questions). 
Another interview was conducted with an 
industry researcher from the United Kingdom. 
The industry researcher has been researching the 
payday lending industry in the UK for several 
years and has contributed to multiple reports. The 
researcher was able to provide information on the 
effects regulations had on the UK payday lending 
market and the process in developing these 
regulations (See Appendix J for questions). 
Interviews were conducted with two 
financial advisors, which allowed us to obtain the 
consumer perspective of payday lending. This 
consumer perspective is important to consider 
when designing legislative initiatives with the 
goal of consumer protection. The financial 
advisors had a unique perspective as a result of 
working closely with those negatively affected by 
these loans. In order to identify legislation that 
will prevent indebtedness, we asked how they 
advise individuals who are indebted to payday 
lenders and how these people get indebted. Also 
the advisors knew the demographics of people 
who tend to need assistance getting out of debt. 
By identifying the financial difficulties of payday 
borrowers, we began to construct initiatives 
which will protect these vulnerable individuals 
(See Appendix I for questions). 
ii Psychographic information describes the values and 
opinions and interests potential customers. 
Figure 7. Junhong interviewing a member of 
Parliament 
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The interviews provided ideas and 
opinions that were sorted into two categories: 
information about problems in the industry and 
details on possible solutions. The proposed 
solutions were cross referenced with legislation 
enacted in the United Kingdom, Australia, 
Sweden and Canada. This allowed us to 
determine the specific problems that each piece 
of legislation targets. 
A multipronged initiative will 
help protect consumer 
We identified three main problems with 
the international payday lending industry: the 
high risk of delinquency, the targeting of 
impulsive consumers, and the cycle of debt (See 
Figure 8). Due to the similarities between the 
Danish and international payday lending 
industries, we can reasonably determine that 
these problems with the industry and their 
potential solutions are applicable to Denmark. 
We drew these similarities according to the data 
gathered from our research. The high APRs, short 
terms, and the focus on speed of Danish payday 
loan products match the payday lending practices 
of international industries. For instance, from our 
website survey we learned online payday 
products in Denmark have an average APR of 
610%. These loans range in principal from 100 
DKK to 25,000 DKK (USD$15 to USD$3,850), 
with loan terms starting at five days. Danish 
payday loan applications have only 6 information 
fields on average. This suggests that Danish 
payday lenders also use speed as a key 
competitive factor. Similar to the international 
payday market, the business practices of Danish 
payday lenders are detrimental and harmful to 
consumers. 
Current credit checking methods 
allow unqualified consumers to 
borrow payday loans 
Danish payday lending companies 
perform an incomplete sequence of credit checks 
for loan applications (See Figure 9). The first step 
of a payday loan credit check is to examine the 
applicant’s basic information, including name, 
address, phone number, bank account number, as 
well as their claimed monthly expenses that are 
not verified by any form of rent or utility bills. In 
the second step, payday lenders go through their 
own internal databases to check for records of the 
applicant’s past loan usage. However, the 
database only has a list of the lenders’ previous 
customers, and information on the borrower’s 
debts in other locations cannot be obtained. After 
conducting an internal check, lenders pay the 
Danish Ministry of Taxation 5 DKK (USD$0.77) 
per customer to obtain the applicant’s income 
information. The data yielded includes the 
applicant’s net income in the year before, and 
their salaries for recent months. Nevertheless, 
current income status such as employment is not 
verified. 
For the last step, lenders spend 15 DKK  
Figure 8. Consumer Issues and Regulatory Solutions 
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(USD$2.30) per customer to check if applicants 
are registered as ‘bad payers’ in the RKI system. 
The RKI system is a registry of individuals who 
have not repaid their debts in the past. This step is 
flawed because it can take up to one year to 
update this list of bad payers, allowing 
unqualified borrowers to use the lending system 
and default multiple times before they are listed in 
the RKI. In addition, credit history is not required 
for payday loan application, so consumers with 
bad or no credit history can also take out payday 
loans.  
Payday lenders harm customers 
with a delinquency-intensive 
business 
 Borrowers who are not able to repay 
payday loans can become delinquent, which 
increases the cost of the loans and harms their 
credit. In 2014, 30% of Danish payday lending 
borrowers were over 10 days delinquent.21 In 
2017, more than 30% of the value of loans issued 
by 4Finance (a Danish payday lending 
conglomerate) were expected to have difficulties 
with repayment. From the same company, over 
46% of Danish loans have not been paid back in 
full within at least 30 days.19 
 Most Danish payday lenders are privately 
traded, and it is therefore difficult to evaluate the 
effects of business practices on consumers. 
However, it is possible to make some 
extrapolations onto the broader Danish market  
 
Figure 9. Current Credit Checking Method used by Lenders 
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using the financial statements of two companies 
operating in Denmark, 4Finance and Ferratum, 
combined with general market data from our 
website survey and the Danish payday lenders 
industry group. For year end 2017, 4Finance had 
approximately nine percent of the 646 million 
DKK (USD$94 million) outstanding payday 
lending liabilities in Denmark. 19, 22 Additionally, 
the two companies 4Finance owns in Denmark, 
Vivus and Zaplo, have similar product profiles to 
those of companies in our survey (See Table 2). 
This similarity justifies the extrapolation of our 
analysis to represent the broad Danish payday 
lending market. 
 Danish payday lenders expense far more 
on impairments as a percent of total operating 
costs than a typical consumer bank. Impairment 
is a measure used by financial entities to estimate 
the amount of money loaned out that will not be 
returned, and it is also an estimate of the rate of 
future delinquencies. The measure of 
impairments is standardized through the 
International Financial Reporting Standards, 
which allows for a consistent comparison. A loan 
is considered impaired if an “Objective loss event 
has occurred” (See Appendix O).23 Impairments 
are used as a basis of comparison and proxy for 
defaults because large commercial banks do not 
disclose their delinquency rates. 
 Impairments account for 46.3% of 
Ferratum’s operating expenses and 30.7% of 
4Finance’s operating expenses (See Figure 10). 
14, 22 High impairment expenses are further 
corroborated by our interview with a payday 
lending industry representative, who said that 
defaults is the largest expense in their lending 
operation. These rates are extremely high when 
compared to a Danish multinational savings bank 
such as Sparekassen Sjælland-Fyn. Sparekassen 
Sjælland-Fyn’s, impairments account for only 
4.2% of operating expenses.15  
 When impairment is substantiated by real 
losses, it becomes delinquency. Of 4Finance’s 
total outstanding loans, 46% are over 30 days 
delinquent (See Figure 11). This rate of 
delinquency is actually expected by 4Finance. 
4Finance categorizes 30% of its current 
outstanding Danish short term loans ‘doubtful 
debt’. This means that 30% of the value of loans 
are not expected to be returned in full. The high 
rate of delinquency represents a large group of 
consumers who were approved for loans they 
could not afford. 
 The high rates of delinquency are the 
result of an intense “splash marketing” strategy. 
‘Splash marketing’ was a term used in interviews 
to describe the marketing strategy of inserting the 
 Vivus Zaplo Ferratum Website Survey Avg 
APR (%) 791.6 151.8 124.22 610.2 
Available loan 
size (DKK) 
100-6000 5000-2500 1500-20000 1107-13875 
Available Loan 
Term (Months) 
.16-1 3-24 5-47 2.25-10.75 
Average Loan 
Size (DKK) 
1,558 - - 7,417 
Table 2. 4Finance and Ferratum’s Products Compared to the Industry Average19, 22 
Figure 10. Danish Payday Lender’s Impairments as a percent of Operating Expenses14, 22 
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message in as many places as possible. This 
intensive marketing brings in customers with 
varying creditworthiness, which increases the 
payday lenders’ delinquency rates. For payday   
lending companies, Ferratum and 4Finance, 
marketing costs are about 15% of overall costs, 
far higher than marketing cost for consumer 
banks (See Figure 10). The consumer savings 
bank has marketing costs so low they are not 
broken out in their operating expenses. 
Extensive marketing captures borrowers 
who are not expected to repay. Credit checking 
may actually be occurring after the loan is issued 
as a test to determine a borrower's likelihood to 
payback future loans. Using loans to check for 
credit worthiness contributes to high delinquency 
and default rates. This phenomenon was found in 
the UK lending market as well. By broadening 
the pool of applicants accepted, lenders can 
screen large numbers of customers with a small 
cash loss because of the low value of the loans. 
The marketing strategy behind this practice to 
broaden the customer profile suggests a 
delinquency intensive business practiced by 
payday lenders, which pushes consumers into a 
cycle of debt. 
Payday loan advertisements target 
impulsive consumers 
Impulsive individuals are more likely to 
borrow for non-essential items because of the low 
barriers to acquire a loan. Marketing is a major 
customer acquisition strategy and helps to bring 
in the types of customers a business wants. 
However, advertisements sometimes attract 
individuals who could be harmed by the product. 
From our interviews, both the behavioral 
specialist and the senior economic advisor said 
that some payday lenders advertise towards 
impulsive individuals. Impulsive people can be 
targeted with the marketing of items such as 
electronics, vacations, and other consumer 
products, which non-impulsive people could save 
for instead.24 Our advertising survey of 32 video 
advertisements supports these claims. 
 Most payday lenders advertise towards 
impulsive individuals by showing non-essential 
items as the intended uses of payday loans. In 
these 32 ads there were 40 different instances of 
an advertised use for the loan, and three instances 
with no advertised use. While four of the 40 
intended uses were for school or emergencies, the 
other 36 advertised towards impulsive 
individuals. The fact that ninety percent of the 
intended uses target impulsive individuals 
verifies the behavioral specialist’s claim that 
payday loan advertisements are tailored to be 
attractive towards impulsive consumers (See 
Figure 12). Given that impulsive individuals have 
greater difficulty paying back loans,25 targeting 
them with payday loan advertisements can put 
them in a dire financial situation. 
The cycle of debt is evident in 
Danish payday lending 
The Danish Competition and Consumer 
Authority’s 2015 study on Danish payday lending 
revealed that 30% of payday lender’s revenues 
are generated from consumers unable to repay on 
time.21 The significant portion of revenue coming 
from consumers who are delinquent suggests that 
there is a cycle of debt within Denmark’s payday 
lending industry. The cycle of debt is detrimental 
to consumer health because it drastically 
increases the final value of the loan. 
The existence of a cycle of debt in 
Denmark was confirmed by two financial 
advisors who observed that individuals take out 
payday loans to cover previous loans. They see 
individuals trapped in a cycle of debt because 
they can only afford to pay the minimum monthly 
amount on their loans. This causes the principal 
value of the loan to decrease very slowly because 
the minimum payment is essentially the interest 
accrued from that month. Our interview with a 
parliamentarian from the Socialists People’s 
Party also reinforces that people are using payday 
loans to pay for their outstanding debt. The 
parliament member said a cycle of debt could 
turn small loans into huge debts, making them 
much harder to repay. Therefore, initiatives 
should be implemented to protect Danish 
consumers from the hazards of payday loans. One 
of these initiatives is a public debtor database. 
Figure 11. 4Finance Gross Receivables19 
30% of payday lender’s revenues 
are generated from consumers 
unable to repay on time.21 
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Initiatives should be taken to 
improve the payday lending market 
 Throughout the process of determining 
Denmark’s payday lending situation, we have 
identified possible initiatives to help protect 
consumers. These initiatives protect consumers to 
various degrees of success by targeting the 
problems identified prior. 
 Regulations tend to target either the 
supply side or the demand side. On the supply 
side, regulations affect business performance by 
limiting the type of product sold. Regulations on 
this side include the interest rate cap, charge cap, 
extension limit, cool-off period, database, and 
cool-down period. On the demand side, 
regulations shape consumer behavior. 
Regulations on this side include the warning 
statement, advertising, cool-down period, and 
education initiatives. To have an effective policy 
package, it is important to both regulate the 
products as well as inform customers. 
A database has the potential to 
improve credit checking and lower 
delinquency 
A database of consumer credit would be 
helpful in lowering delinquency by providing 
more credit information to lenders. Access to 
more credit information has been shown to lower 
default rates. In the United States, increasing 
borrower information sharing reduced default 
rates among high risk borrowers by 14%.26  This 
finding is also consistent with a study on the 
introduction of a credit rating agency in Albania, 
which reduced the overall possibility of arrears 
(no or late payment) by 35%. The reduction in 
delinquency was found to be even more 
pronounced for repeat borrowers. This is an ideal 
result as the cycle of debt is caused by repeat 
borrowing. In addition, this same study also 
found that the database’s effect on access to 
credit and cost of credit was negligible.27 
Credit databases internationally are either 
run by the government (public) such as the 
Albanian solution, or privately run by companies 
such as Experian in Denmark and the United 
States. A global study of over 40 credit rating 
agencies nationally concluded that both public 
and private registries have the same effect on 
lowering defaults.28 Using these examples, we 
can infer that the introduction of a database will 
lower defaults and may reduce the number of 
repeat borrowers with delinquent payments. 
Credit rating agencies tend to have privacy 
concerns associate. Different countries afford 
individuals privacy protections such as mandatory 
data deletion after five or seven years (United 
States, Finland), or bans on the collection of 
certain data types.28 
The current proposed solution in Denmark 
would be a government-run database. With the 
database, lenders would input private information 
provided to them by individual customers, and 
receive information specific to that customer. The 
Figure 12. Advertised Uses of Payday Loans 
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government would require all debts to be reported 
to the database, and this information could be 
supplemented with government tax data.  
In this solution, the advantages for the 
lender are clear: the database would be free for  
lenders to query, making costly credit checks 
obsolete. Reducing the cost of credit checks 
would lower customer acquisition costs and 
directly boost the lenders’ bottom line. For 
consumers, a government-run database would 
protect them from unaffordable loans. By 
increasing transparency in the credit rating space, 
credit-worthy individuals would have easier 
access to capital, and individuals concealing debt 
within the current system would not be able to 
take out loans they cannot afford. 
Five out of seven interviewees from 
different viewpoints were in favor of creating a 
government-run database (See Figure 13). There 
is broad support for this initiative with the lending 
industry representative being the most in favor. 
The behavioral specialist expressed the most 
concern about the database. He was concerned 
that the database would help the lenders more 
than the consumers. The senior economic advisor 
also expressed concerns with the database, but his 
concerns were rooted in the privacy aspect of the 
database. 
Regulations can prevent 
advertisements from targeting 
impulsive consumers 
Marketing is very prominent in the payday 
lending industry, and some countries have begun 
to regulate the way their payday lending products 
are advertised. Australia, the UK, and Sweden 
require a warning statement on payday lending 
websites and advertisements.29, 30, 31 According to 
the regulations, the statement must include a 
warning about the high risk of debt and contact 
information for debt advisors. For example, the 
UK regulation requires all payday lending 
websites and payday loan advertisements on 
television to include the risk warning: “late 
repayment can cause you serious money 
problems”. The regulation also requires all 
payday lending websites to include a price 
comparison with other payday products. 
Views on this solution varied throughout 
our interviews. The payday lender that we 
interviewed did not support restrictions on 
advertising. The lender claimed that consumers 
should be able to use the loans for whatever they 
want, and the marketing should reflect that. On 
the other side, two of the parliament members 
believed that these loans should have advertising 
regulations similar to those imposed on alcohol 
and tobacco. Meanwhile, the financial advisors 
also believed that less exposure would help in 
reducing the number of people taking out these 
loans. The behavioral specialist took a different 
approach, by suggesting a limit on the locations in 
which payday loan advertisements can be shown. 
To prevent impulsive individuals from being 
tempted to buy consumer goods, the specialist 
suggested a limit on the content of payday loan 
advertisements, where payday loan 
advertisements only show text. No pictures or 
intended uses for the loans should be shown. This 
reasoning matches the idea that consumers tend to 
buy impulsively when their attention is grabbed 
Figure 13. Stakeholder Favorability of Debtor Database 
In Favor Opposed 
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by pleasing goods.32 
Denmark has taken steps towards 
protecting impulsive borrowers. In 2017, a cool-
off period of 48 hours was enacted to prevent 
impulsive decisions, by giving consumers 48 
hours before receiving the money to think over 
the loan, and have a chance to cancel. The theory 
behind this regulation is rooted in delayed 
gratification, which suggests that impulsive 
purchases are more likely to be reconsidered 
rationally, if the consequences of the immediate 
purchase are reviewed.33 The 48 hour cool-off 
period allows for this review of the 
consequences, and can therefore help stop 
impulsive purchases. However, the cool-off 
period regulation was worded to apply only to 
unsecured consumer loans with terms under three 
months. As a result, lenders created new products 
including installment loans that had terms longer 
than three months, and cash credits, which were 
not considered “loans”, to bypass the new 
legislation.34 Because these new products either 
have longer terms, or are lines of credit from the 
lender rather than a cash loan, they are free from 
the cool-off period restriction. From our website 
survey, 85.7% of payday lending websites in 
Denmark are now using these new forms of credit 
or installment, and only two lenders are still 
providing traditional payday loans exclusively 
(See Figure 14). Moreover, about half of the 
payday lenders are now only offering products 
with terms longer than three months to get around 
the regulation (See Figure 15). This demonstrates 
the flexibility of short term high cost consumer 
credit products. When crafting regulations, it is 
important to design the regulation to capture all 
aspects of the industry.  
 
 
Several initiatives have the 
potential to curb the cycle of debt 
One regulation to help prevent the cycle 
of debt would be the implementation of a charge 
cap on loans. These caps are a limit to the amount 
charged on top of (not including) the principal 
loan amount. A charge cap would prevent 
consumers from having to pay multiple times the 
original loan amount, making repayment more 
manageable. Charge caps have been implemented 
in Australia, the UK, and Sweden.16, 29, 35 The UK 
and Sweden established a charge cap that made 
interest and fees not exceed 100% of the original 
loan.29, 35 Australia has this same cap with the 
stipulation that it only applies to borrowers that 
default on the loan.16 The UK tested caps 
between 50% and 200% and believe that the 
100% cap balanced the protection of consumers, 
while allowing lenders to continue offering loans 
for varying amounts of time. The 100% value 
also allowed consumers to better understand the 
loan.36 According to both financial advisors, 
charge caps are an effective way to limit the APR 
indirectly, as it stops the interest from further 
accrual after reaching the cost limit. 
Another regulation to prevent the cycle of 
debt is the APR limit (interest rate cap). Similar 
to the charge cap, this limits the total cost of the 
loan by reducing the rate at which interest 
accrues. This is a popular regulation amongst 
countries with strong payday lending regulations: 
the United Kingdom, Australia, and Sweden have 
all implemented some sort of interest rate cap. 
The UK established a cap of 0.8% each day 
(1733% APR) on payday loans in 2014.35 As of 
2012, Australia has a 20% cap on the initial loan 
Figure 14. Payday Lender’s Product Types 
Figure 15. Range of Loan Terms 
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following (85% APR).16 In 2018, Sweden created 
an APR cap of 40% in addition to the national 
bank’s current interest rate.29 The UK had tested 
several different caps between 0.4% to 1% per 
day before ultimately deciding on a limit of 0.8%. 
Having a low daily cap decreases the cost of 
loans paid on time; it also means that the cost is 
reliant on the duration of loans.36 In 2017, the 
Socialists People’s Party in Denmark proposed an 
interest rate cap similar to the Swedish cap. The 
proposed cap was 15% in addition to the national 
bank’s current interest rate. One representative 
from Parliament explained that 15% was a 
starting point and the party was willing to go up 
to 30%. Our analysis of lender websites in 
Denmark revealed the average APR of a loan was 
610%. This proposed cap is significantly lower 
than existing rates. 
Both the charge cap and limiting the 
interest rate also help with the risk of default. The 
charge cap helps with the risk of default by 
limiting the total repayment amount of the loan. 
The interest rate cap lowers the risk of default by 
slowing the growth of the loan. Limiting the 
maximum repayment amount and slowing the 
growth of the loan make the repayment of a loan 
more manageable, therefore triggering fewer 
defaults. We believe that the charge cap would be 
a better alternative than the interest rate cap. The 
implementation of an interest rate cap would lead 
lenders to the same interest rate on products, 
while a charge cap allows for more autonomy in 
their business models. The behavioral specialist 
said that an APR limit could destroy the market 
by forcing lenders to have the same business 
models (See Figure 16). 
Restricting the number of times a loan can 
be extended is another potential solution to 
prevent the cycle of debt. Extensions to payday 
loans generate more interest on the loans and 
create more fees for consumers. With extension 
limits, borrowers cannot continuously extend the 
loan, which reduces accumulation of interest and 
rollover fees. The UK and Sweden have both 
enacted regulations to limit loan extensions. In 
the UK, there is a limit of two extensions for a 
loan, while in Sweden only one extension is 
allowed per loan.29, 37 The Sweden extension limit 
also requires that the extension is either no cost to 
the consumer, or that there is a clear repayment 
plan for the additional interest along with the 
original cost.29 An extension limit has the 
potential to increase the risk of default, as it 
eliminates the option of continued rollovers and 
forces consumers to repay the principal. 
Therefore, we decided that the extension limit 
would not an optimal solution, as it might 
amplify the risk of default while preventing the 
cycle of debt. 
Cool-down periods also help prevent debt 
cycles by restricting the frequency of payday loan 
use. With a cool-down period enacted, companies 
are not allowed to give a second loan to 
customers until the cool-down period has expired. 
In Australia, a cool-down period of 90 days was 
implemented in 2012. Implementing this cool-
down period prevented consumers from taking 
out new loans to cover previous loans.16 The cool-
down period restricts consumers from payday  
Figure 16. Stakeholder Favorability of an APR Cap 
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loans for a period of time, which can result in a 
situation where a consumer is unable to access 
necessary capital.31 Due to this disadvantage of 
the cool-down period, we determined that a cool-
down period would be less effective than the 
combination of a charge cap and a database. 
Making loans easier to repay would reduce the 
need to take out additional loans, while a database 
would allow lenders to see any current loans a 
potential customer has, when going through the 
credit checking process. 
 Through a combination of sources, we 
have determined that financial education is not a 
viable option to protect consumers from payday 
loan indebtedness. The Financial Consumer 
Agency of Canada has created educational 
resources on consumer credit. These resources 
explain the effect of payday loans on a borrower’s 
financial stability, as well as the alternatives to 
these high cost loans.38 However, a meta-analysis 
of 168 papers covering 201 studies found that 
interventions to improve financial literacy only 
account for 0.1% of variance in financial 
behaviors.39 Therefore, we can conclude that the 
resources required to carry out this initiative 
would not justify the outcomes. The behavioral 
specialist confirmed that educational initiatives 
are often ineffective. The financial advisors on 
the other hand strongly supported this idea, and 
believed that consumers would be able to make 
better decisions if they were more informed. They 
suggested a system where lenders are required to 
pay a fee towards financial counseling and 
education. Financial education is important and 
should be added to school curricula, but would 
not be effective as an intervention mechanism to 
fix the current payday lending problem, so more 
regulatory initiatives should be imposed. While 
regulatory initiatives would be able to actively 
protect consumers, proactive education allows 
them to make better choices in the long run. 
Gauging the effectiveness of specific 
regulations is difficult 
 Our research identified some evidence to 
determine the effectiveness of regulations. In both 
the UK and Australia, there has been a decline in 
the industry after regulations were implemented 
(See Figure 17). In Australia, the number of 
lenders in the industry had a six percent decline in 
the 12 months following the implementation of a 
charge cap, APR cap, cool-down period, and 
warning statements in 2012. This shows that the 
impact on the industry was noticeable, as there 
was a large amount of growth in prior years.16 In 
the UK, after the 2014 regulations, including a 
charge cap, an interest rate cap, an extension 
limit, and warning statements, 38% of UK lenders 
stopped operating by the end of 2016.40 The 
Financial Conduct Authority of the UK 
performed a market review in 2017, and found 
evidence of a healthier payday lending market 
under the regulations. Their study showed that 
800,000 customers had saved 150 million pounds 
(1.26 billion DKK/ 23 million USD) in fees, and 
payday loan approval rates dropped by 50% just 
six months after the regulatory change.40 Citizen 
Advice, the largest debt advice provider in UK, 
reported that the number of clients seeking 
payday loan advice dropped by 45% in the year 
following the regulation.40 Moreover, UK’s 
largest debt charity, Step Change, also showed a 
30% reduction in both the number and proportion 
of clients seeking payday loan advice after the 
Figure 17. International Payday Lending Regulations 
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dropped by 45% in the year following the 
regulation.40 Moreover, UK’s largest debt charity, 
Step Change, also showed a 30% reduction in 
both the number and proportion of clients seeking 
payday loan advice after the legislation was 
enacted.41 Despite industry declines, a healthier 
market for consumers is an ideal outcome. 
However, data concerning the 
effectiveness of specific payday lending 
regulations is limited throughout our research. 
When several regulations are implemented at 
once, it is difficult to determine the direct impact 
each regulation had on the industry and 
consumers. Further, unexpected effects such as 
the introduction of new products or changes in 
consumer behavior may be caused by the 
regulation. The rapid shift to credit products from 
closed end loans highlights how regulations can 
be circumvented with relative ease, if they are not 
broad enough. Therefore, the target of regulation 
for this industry should not be specific to the 
payday loan product. It should be designed to 
protect consumers from high cost short term 
credit products, including overdraft fees as well 
as high interest rate credit of any kind. Although 
legislation on a broader range of industries may 
deter the implementation of these regulations, it’s 
the best for the purpose of consumer protection. 
We propose a combination of 
regulations to protect Danish 
consumers 
For the purpose of protecting Danish 
consumers from payday loan indebtedness, a 
multipronged approach is the optimal way to 
regulate the industry. Our policy proposal 
consists of four initiatives designed to work well 
together. We propose the use of a charge cap, 
advertising regulation, an expansion of the cool-
off period, and a database (See Figure 18). A 
piece of legislation with multiple initiatives 
would be the best choice to handle the flexibility 
of payday products as well as the sophistication 
of the market. 
First, A database will lower the rate of 
defaults and delinquencies by increasing the level 
of information sharing among lenders. The 
increased data sharing enhances the effectiveness 
of credit checks. This will be a publicly run 
database which the lenders can query in order to 
check the credit history of potential borrowers. 
All lenders would be required to contribute 
borrower information to this database. 
In order to deal with the targeting of 
impulsive individuals through marketing,  
 
Figure 18. The proposed regulations and the problems they target 
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advertising restrictions should be implemented. 
Payday loan advertisements should not have 
images associated with them because images 
increase their attractiveness in the eyes of 
impulsive consumers. Additionally, payday 
lenders should not be able to advertise a proposed 
use for the loan. Banning the content of proposed 
use prevents the advertisements from encouraging 
impulsive purchases of consumer goods with 
payday loans. 
If the advertising limit is not effective in 
deterring impulsive consumers, the 48-hour cool-
off period will be another preventative measure. 
To recapture credit products in 48 hour cool-off 
period, we advise broadening the definition of 
regulated product to reduce impulsive use of 
payday loans. The new cool-off period will 
involve all unsecured consumer loans and credit 
with APRs at least equal to 30% plus the national 
bank's interest rate. However, this initiative will 
be more restrictive of consumer credit. This 
recommendation works with the advertising 
limits to lower payday lenders’ targeting of 
impulsive consumers. 
The charge cap will provide backup 
consumer protection of the advertising limit, 48 
cool-off period, and database enhanced credit 
check are not successful in preventing individuals 
from taking out payday loans when they are 
unable to afford the loan. Preventing further debt 
growth via a charge cap makes it so that the 
consumer is less likely to spiral into excessive 
indebtedness. We recommend not including the 
stipulation that a consumer must default on the 
loan for the charge cap to apply. This ensures that 
all consumers, especially people who default on 
loans and those who pay minimal amounts 
towards the loan, are protected from the cycle of 
debt. The charge cap will also help the consumers 
and payday lender lower the risk of default. Once 
the cap is reached the consumer can be placed on 
a payment plan that will prevent them from 
defaulting on the loan. Since the loan no longer 
grows, this plan can fit the consumer's budget. 
Finally, it is difficult to gauge how the 
payday lending industry is affecting consumers 
without data from an impartial third party. The 
move to regulate lenders under the Danish 
Financial Supervisory Authority is a good step in 
this direction. The Financial Supervisory 
Authority now requires the reporting of Key 
Performance Indicators. These indicators are 
measures of the health of banks operating in 
Denmark. The Key Performance Indicators will 
facilitate comparison of these lenders to other 
types of financial institutions. Additionally, under 
the Financial Supervisory Authority, Payday 
lenders will be required to obtain a banking 
license, which will ease future enforcement 
measures. Requiring lenders to report the number 
of borrowers and the total amount of loans as well 
as delinquent payments will strike a balance 
between high compliance costs and effective 
government oversight. Information about how 
many rollovers a customer uses per year as well 
as the total number of loans a customer takes out 
per year should be recorded. These metrics will 
assist in the monitoring of industry growth, 
consumer health, and effects of regulation. 
The path forward 
When considering the types of initiatives 
that should be taken in Denmark to protect 
consumers, we rooted our recommendations in 
managing the three problems with the payday 
lending market. The initiatives taken need to deal 
with the targeting of impulsive consumers, the 
cycle of debt, and the risk of default. No one 
initiative can successfully protect consumers, so 
we suggest a combination of regulations which 
will regulate the supply and demand side of the 
issue and mitigate the three consumer threats. 
We suggest the following initiatives to 
involve all Danish payday loan products, 
including all unsecured consumer loans and credit 
offered in Denmark, with annual percentage rates 
at least equal to 30% plus the Danish national 
bank’s interest rate. 
 
 A consumer credit database: we 
propose establishing a government-run credit 
database, in order to improve sharing of credit 
history and strengthen credit checking 
systems. 
 
 Limitations on payday loan 
advertisements: we suggest banning the 
use of images in advertisements of Danish 
payday loan products to prevent the targeting 
of impulsive consumers with attractive 
intended uses. 
 
 A strengthened 48 hour cool-off 
period: we propose broadening the scope of 
the current 48 hour cool-off period in 
Denmark to apply all forms of high cost 
consumer credit. 
 
 A 100% charge cap: we suggest 
imposing a 100% charge cap on all Danish 
payday loan products, such that the interest 
rate plus fees cannot exceed the original loan 
amount. 
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Recommendation for more data 
disclosure regarding the issue of payday 
loans: we suggest the Danish government 
require more data disclosure from providers of 
payday loan products. This increased 
transparency will help to measure the magnitude 
of payday lending problem in Denmark, as well 
as evaluate the effectiveness of different 
initiatives. 
Limitations 
Throughout our research on payday 
lending in Denmark, we consistently had 
difficulty accessing data relating to the payday 
lending market because most payday companies 
are privately owned and not required to disclose 
data. More accessible data related to the payday 
lending market would allow researchers to 
determine the magnitude of the payday lending 
problem in Denmark. More data would also allow 
a better analysis of the regulations’ effectiveness 
on the industry and consumers. 
During our study, we were generally 
lacking the perspective of the lenders. One 
interview cannot summarize the opinions and 
operations of an entire industry, especially when 
our proposal is burdensome on the lenders 
overall. We also used numerous studies on the 
payday lending market in other nations to fill in 
gaps in Danish research. Other countries have 
their own unique set of social, economic, and 
political dynamics. This limits the degree to 
which consumer problems and the effects of 
regulation can be translated to Denmark. 
Although our study examined the applicability of 
other regulations to Denmark, we were not 
specific on how Denmark could leverage existing 
government programs and create new ones to 
ease the implementation of our regulatory 
recommendations. 
Future Research 
Data should be gathered related to both 
the customer profile and the lending practices. 
Information about the age, financial status, 
borrowing practices, and reasons for payday loan 
use of the typical borrower would allow for the 
creation of initiatives more tailored to the Danish 
consumers. Information gathered from lenders 
regarding the number of payday loans, rate of 
defaults and number of late payments would give 
a greater understanding of the market. Collecting 
data on the number of canceled loans during the 
cool-off period would allow researchers to 
determine if that initiative is useful. 
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